The choice of the resolution of conflict by arbitration conducted by the mediator in the conflict to establish and monitor over time the specific causal relationships between trade, conflict, and rules thus legalizing politics. In other words, legalization would operate over time, a transfer of skills as well as powers to judicial bodies, ad hoc and/or permanent. Therefore, should it be considered, despite the differences they each have, that insofar as those courts are derived from dynamic with similarities in their substance, functions, and in their statutes, they are complementary and contribute to better compliance with international rules? Or, rather, the proliferation of courts and systems of settlement of disputes reflects the fragmentation of an international normative space, not conducive to a stable international scene that would place these jurisdictions in a competitive situation, adding, in the case of the African state already fundamentally unstable, to its instability and chronic marginalization? Is the accusation that “globalization of law and order” or “globalization of justice” through “Good Governance” and the international legalization of the fight against corruption, threatens the sovereignty of States, credible in law? The short answer is: no. Though it’s a “close call” by most accounts, there is no evidence or basis, legal or otherwise, that the so-called globalization of law and order constitutes a violation of sovereignty. Moreover. It seems to be a positive development of international law in the sense of greater synergy in the fight against a phenomenon with ramifications at both domestic and international levels. The positive effects of increasing international legalization of corruption are evident: for one, the result of illegal acts – the diversion of the funds looted to tax havens – in most cases so far out of reach, for most domestic judiciary systems is once again in the crosshairs of justice with, more than in the past, concrete opportunities to be followed by measures of repatriation. On Saturday, March 11, 2006, (finally) caving to international pressure and the devastating effects of the stigma of perceived generalized corruption on foreign investment, the President of the Republic of Cameroon created a National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and officially launched “Operation Hawk” (“Opération Épervier” in French). Today, by the admission of Cameroonian authorities themselves, this institution has so far produced mixed results, at best. Indeed, the lack of independence and means – in the broadest sense of the term: legal, political, logistics … – has not allowed the National Commission on Anti-Corruption to establish itself as an effective structure to fight corruption, nor its ministerial offices, created to bring the fight to the lowest levels of government. Moreover, the draft text prepared in 2001 by the ad hoc committee to create a structure to fight corruption nationwide has not yet yield the results expected. Several measures provided in the Governmental Plan for the Fight against Corruption – part of the “Action plan for governance” agreed upon with Bretton Woods Institutions – are still not implemented, including a coalition Government-Civil society against corruption. This instability, nurtured “from within”, ensures the sustainability, is the best guarantee for the status quo, for all people living off corruption in Cameroon.